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Article 9

Created in the Image of God:
Man and Abortion
Robert Siesinski
In the Book of Genesis, we read
that God created man in His own
image and likeness (Gn 1:26f;
5:1; 9:6).J The inspired author of
this book uses the expression,
"image and likeness of God"!
with a specific didactic aim in
mind. His intent is to affirm that
man is the apex of God's earthly
creation, and has been granted a
special place in the order of earthly creation; first, in relation to
other creatures and creations, and
secondly, in relation to God Himself. 1
This vision of man is not
unique to Genesis, but rather recurs in other books of the Old
Testament as well. For example,
the psalmist admirably expresses
the relation of man to the world:

Yet you [Yahweh] have made him
(man] little less than a god ,
you have crowned him with glory
and splendor,
made him lord over the work of
your hands,
set all things under his feet,
sheep and oxen , all these,
yes, wild animals too ,
birds in the air, fish in the sea
travelling the pa ths of the ocean.
(Ps 8:5-8)

The psalmist, likewise, throughout his entire corpus, eloquently
expounds man's manifold relationship with God. Reading and
meditating on the psalms, we witness that a real, dialogical relationship obtains between man and
God in prayer. In his prayers of
adoration, petition, thanksgiving,
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and praise, man does not merely
express a formal belief in the existence of God, but above all actualizes his faith by turning to
God as existing for him. 4 Man in
prayer, as it were, reveals his person, confides his secrets, and entrusts his being to God. s
Elsewhere in the Old Testament, we are told in what the
divine image consists. God has endowed man with an immortal soul
(d. Ws 2:23) and with an intellect and free will reflecting His
own perfections of understanding
and willing (d. Si 17: 7). Thus, on
account of this divine image within himself, man enjoys stewardship over all other creatures and
creations of the world (Gn 1: 2630; Ws 9:2f; Si 17:2££). In addition, and above all, the fact that
man is created in the image of
God is the basis for the deduction
that homicide is immoral:
He who sheds man 's blood,
shall have his blood shed by man,
for in the image of God
(Gn 9:6)
man was m a de.

The lofty, Biblical vision of
man as created in the image and
likeness of God has been the fertile ground and recurrent theme
of Christian reflection from the
patristic era to our own times.
Accordingly, Christian thinkers
have carefully distinguished and
analyzed the two notions, image
of God (imago Dei) and likeness
of God (similitudo Dei), which
constitute the essence of the Biblical doctrine. As these two elements are the integral features of
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this doctrine, no comprehensive
and just assessment of it is possible without a prior appreciation
and true understanding of each
component part.
The imago Dei refers to man's
basic value as a person. It is a
value realized by a human being's
mere existence. In other words,
we may say that the imago Dei
constitutes, as it were, the divinely-willed " giveness" of human nature. This "giveness" essentially
embraces man's endowment with
an immortal soul and an intellect,
reason, and free will, which found
the dignity of the human person.
These latter mental faculties are
the cornerstone of man's spirituality, and give man a certain nobility that distinguishes him from
all other creatures. He, unlike
other creatures, is capable of becoming conscious of his own existence and discovering his unique
existential state. Moveover, these
gifts empower man to develop and
fashion his environment-indeed,
to "create" his own world. Thus,
man truly reflects God and His
perfections. Of course, it would be
a gross exaggeration to state that
man is, in a strict sense, the image
of God. This overstates man's true
importance, and obscures the central truth of man's creaturehood.
Only Christ is the perfect image of
God. Only in Him are all the divine perfections verified. Man is
no more than a pale, analogous
reflection of the divine image.
Thus, Sacred Scripture merely
states that man is created in the
image of God. 6
37

If the imago Dei constitutes
the foundation of man's value as
a person, the similitudo D ei, on
the other hand, is the raison
d'et re or very goal of human existence.' The similitudo D ei is
man's free realization and actualization of his imago D ei. Man's
reason and free will allow him to
concert with moral values and to
take an active role in the moral
drama of daily life. On this level
man act ualizes his freedom in an
incomparable way. He attains
moral perfection through the realization of his potentialities, and
achieves the most complete development of his personality.
From Christian Revelation we
learn , however, that man's imago
D ei has been blemished by sin,
and that a full realization of self
depends on man's free cooperation with God's gratuitous grace.
Man can participate in God's
goodness, and have his nature
transformed only if he is receptive
to the curative and elevating activity of grace.

The Biblical doctrine of man as
created in the image and likeness
of God, a perennial object of
Christian speculation, is, likewise,
an optimum point of departure for
synthesizing and evaluating many
contemporary positions regarding
the nature and moral significance
of abortion. Our aim is no more
than to demonstrate that a clear
consonance exists between this
doctrine of man and our reflections on abortion.~ The timeless
value of the Bible's teaching and
its total relevance and full applicability to today's world and its
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problems come poignantly to the
fore in the abortion controversy.
Erroneous understandings of
the nature of man and abortion
appear to fall into two categories.
First, there are the errors which
tend to overemphasize the similitudo Dei at the price of a total or
partial neglect of the imago Dei;
and, secondly, there are those
which seem to misinterpret the
nature of the imago Dei. These
two categories of errors often are
interwoven in contemporary speculat ions on abortion. Furthermore, both classes of errors are
by and large the bitter outcome of
the antimetaphysical t hinking of
the modern age.
The former type of error is
typified by Daniel Callahan in his
book, Abortion: Law, Choice &
Morality." Dr. Callahan writes:
Abortion is a n act of killing. the
violent, direct destruction of poten·
tial huma n life, a l ready in the process of developmen t. That fact
s hould not be disgui sed, or glossed
over by e uphemi sm a nd c ircumlocu tion. It is not the destruction of a
human person-for at no stage of
its deve lopme nt does the conceptus
fulfill the d e finition of a pe rson ,
which implies a d eveloped ca pacity
fo r reasoning, willing, d esiring and
relating to others-bu t it is the d estru ction of a n important a nd valuable form of huma n life.1'iI

The definition of the human
person contained in this passage
is of immediate interest and crucial import. It is a typically
psychologistic definition of the
human person, since it restricts
its attention solely to those as- ,
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pects of personal activity, which
are the clear manifestations of a
conscious human person. Dr.
Callahan's definition, as can readily be seen, implies that a gradation exists among persons qua
persons according to their "developed capacities" for distinctly
personal activities. That is, it
would seem that a person endowed with fewer intellectual
gifts and less capable of social
intercourse is, on this score alone,
less a person . To continue in this
line of reasoning, moreover, it
would appear that if a particular
human individual were to lack
these capacities (e.g., a fetus, a
severely mentally handicapped
person, an aged senile person,
etc.) , "it" could not be considered
a personal being. Therefore, its
killing could not be properly considered a homicide.
This psychologistic conception
of the nature of the human person, accordingly, necessitates a
real dualism-as this passage
from Dr. Callahan's book clearly
demonstrates-between potential
human life and fully human life
or, to employ other terminology,
between merely human life and
truly person-al life. Here, it is not
a question of a simple distinction
of different aspects contained
within the human person himself,
i.e., of those aspects of the human
person more evidently personal
(reason, free will, capacity for
interpersonal relationships, etc.)
from those more strictly animal [[
held in common with other animals (digestive and circulatory
systems, for example). Rather,
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we are presented with a manifest
bifurcation between personal and
non-personal life.
The psychologistic conception
of the nature of the human person, however, is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. As
Dietrich von Hildebrand in his
Ethics 12 skillfully shows, it confuses and identifies the concept of
the "person" with that of "personality." A personality is someone
who more fully embodies the idea
of man. Personality is a qualitative
notion referring directly to those
intellectual, moral, and social
qualities and traits we like to see a
man possess. But there is never a
personality apart from an already
existing personal subject, which is
the essential precondition for the
development of a personality. The
range of possible development
among personalities is considerable, and to classify all the diverse types of personalities is a
formidable undertaking. At any
rate, a personality, par excellence,
is necessarily a saint, a person,
who has fully cooperated with
God's grace in realizing his similitudo Dei.
Notwithstanding the true importance and ultimate interest in
saintly personalities, personhood
is, nevertheless, the more foundational and basic reality as it is the
ontological notion referring to the
being all men share. In other
words, the notion, "person" refers
to man's imago Dei, while the
notion, "personality" ultimately
indicates the similitudo Dei. Accordingly, although a noteworthy
gradation obtains among human
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personalities-from the awe-inspiring, yet humble personalities
of saints to the more superficial
and bourgeois ones encountered
in daily life - no gradation exists among human persons. All
human persons, in that they are
persons, are equal in the eyes of
God.
The apparent, non-metaphysical approach underlying the psychologistic conception of the
nature of man merits attention.
This stance unilaterally emphasizes man's unique processes and
activities, and neglects his more
fundamental being. Consequently, its understanding and appraisal
of the nature of man tends to remain on a purely functional level.
This fact plus the concomitant
failure to marvel at and appreciate the primordial aspects of the
simple being of man not infrequently favor the drawing of an
unwarranted conclusion : namely,
only those human individuals actually engaging in these distinctly personal activities and fun ctions or with the immediate capacity to do so are truly men or
really human persons. If a greater
attentiveness to man's being were
present, on the other hand, one
would be more reluctant to deprive a particular human being
(e.g., a fetus or a senile man) of
personhood merely owing to the
lack of certain processes indIcative of "functioning" human persons.
This same w e a k n e s s also
plagues the various sociologistic
approaches to the nature of man.
Ashley Montagu J3 typifies this
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school of thought when he writes:
. .. the embryo, fetus and n ewborn
of the huma n species, in point of
fact, do not really become functionally hum a n until humanized in
the human socialization process.
Humanity is a n achievement, not
a n endowment.

In a word, a person is no more
than a function of society. Humanity is not an intrinsic dignity,
but merely a dignity (like a trophy, perhaps) conferred by society to a possible human subject
granted its sufficient social development. Before the conferment of
humanity by society, presumably,
the killing of this subject would
not be a homicide.
Clearly, the same confusion
symptomatic of the psychologistic
conception is at work here. Personality once again is mistaken
for the person. Once more, certain
aspects of man, like his essentially social nature and his capacity
to engage in interpersonal relationships, receive exclusive attention. However, these aspects,
though undeniably true marks of
the nature of man, nonetheless
denote a more fully developed
man alone. It is, therefore, invalid
to give them the sole consideration and attribute an absolute
value to them. Otherwise, a dualism analogous to the one implied
by the psychologistic understanding of the nature of man obtains.
Human individuals subsequently
fall into two categories: those in
a pre-social, and therefore prehuman or pre-personal state and
those socialized, i.e., the "true
Linacre Quarterly

men" or "real persons."
The critique of the psychologistic and sociologistic conceptions of the nature of man is both
simple and the same. Their dualistic separation 14 of human individuals into pre-social, potential
human persons, on the one hand,
and fully humanized or true human persons,l S on the other, presents an inescapable and unsolvable dilemma. How does one know
In
a non-peremptory manner
when the difference becomes
manifest? That is, how does one
fix the point between the two
stages without arbitrariness? In
short, is it not impossible to find
a criterion to deterinine what is
"authentically" hum a nan d
"truly" personal which does not
completely beg the question in
the first place?
Finally, there are those erroneous views concerning the nature
of man, which appear to refer
more directly to the imago Dei in
that they do not mistake "personality" for "person" in their
treatment of this question. For
synthetical purposes, we may
designate these views the overly
biologistic or mechanical conceptions of the nature of man. The
center of the debate gravitates
around one's particular interpretation of the phenomenon, life itself. To express this issue more
immediately in terms of the abortion controversy, the chief question is whether the life present in
the embryo and the fetus (at
least in its initial stages) can be
justly considered human life.
The following objection is freFebruary, 1976

quently raised: human life can
not possibly be present in the
zygote, the embryo, and the fetus
(again, at least in its initial
stages) , since no brain is yet present. 16 As this physical organ is the
necessary condition for man's rational activity by which he is distinguished from mere animals, no
human life obtains until the existence of a brain is verified in the
fetus. This objection, however, is
based on a faulty understanding
of the process of growth witnessed
in living phenomena as it presupposes a mechanical understanding
of organic growth.
In this line, the noted abortion
advocate, Dr. Paul Ehrlich states
that a "fetus isn't a human being;
it's a potential human being. Religious objectors [to abortion] are
confusing the blueprints for a
building with the building itself."1 7 This analogy, however, is
fallacious. Insofar as a process of
growth is described, no significant
correspondence whatever is to be
found between a blueprint and a
fetus. 1s A blueprint never transforms itself into a building; it
never becomes an integral part of
the building it represents. True,
contractors do enlist blueprints
as aids, but they construct buildings with timber, stone, mortar,
etc. The zygote, on the other
hand, does in fact organize, develop, and transform itself into an
embryo. A comparable process of
internal growth occurs in the embryo, the fetus, and the child until the adult individual results.
Obviously, when we employ the
terms, zygote, embryo, fetus, and

41

child in describing a process of
growth, we are not referring to
different individuals as such, but
rather to different stages of
growth witnessed in anyone individual organism. All the material supplies used in constructing
buildings, on the other hand, do
enjoy separate existences before
the construction of the completed
building.
In sum, if a fetus is considered
human in a later stage of growth,
it is difficult to understand why
it could be less human or not human at all in an earlier period of
its existence. Considering humanity in an organic perspective,
therefore, it is not evident why a
special significance should be attributed to the appearance of the
brain. Human individuals, after
all, do not roll off a production
line upon the assemblage of a
brain.
Some authors 19 sharing this interpretation and critique of the
mechanical understanding of human life would use it to support
the theory of the immediate animation of the human soul in the
zygote, i.e., that there is truly
human life in the zygote from the
moment of conception. Others,
notably Joseph Donceel, S.J. ,2"
in an interesting twist of thought,
see in this critique of the mechanical conception of human life
a confirmation of its contrary, the
theory of the mediate animation
of the human soul. In other
words, these latter support the
position that the humanity of the
conceptus comes at some later
date.
42

Fr. Donceel favors a change in
terminology, however. He prefers
instead to speak of "immediate
animation" and "delayed hominization."21 According to his usage
of these terms, no one places in
doubt the fact of the immediate
animation of the zygote with life.
The point in great dispute, on the
other hand, is whether this living
cell is immediately human. Fr.
Donceel supports the view that
the hominization of the conceptus
occurs at a later date, i.e., is delayed.
In the various critical expositions of the mechanical conception of human life-be they those
supporting immediate hominization or be they those upholding
delayed hominization-however,
there seems to be more or less
universal agreemen t on one point,
namely, that a Cartesian-dualist
metaphysics implicitly underlies
this view. This dualism holds that
man is composed of two separate
substances, the soul (the thinking
substance of the mind) and the
body (an extended substance ).
The interpretations of this dualism vary, however. On the one
hand, employing the dualist schema of man as a mind in a machine, one could argue that such
a dualist vision tends more to fa vor delayed hominization since
the infusion of the human soul
into a ltlOre completely organized
body would be analogous to pouring gasoline into a completed motor, not yet in operation. Accordingly, the humanity or the "functioning humanly" of an individual
can come about only once the
Linacre Quarterly

body is sufficiently organized
physically and thereby capable of
receiving the "fuel" of the human
soul.
But, to go in the opposite direction, one could legitimately
challenge the validity of this dualist argument, and, thus, deny the
truth of its conclusion, delayed
hominization by attacking and rejecting the soundness of the
analogy employed to sustain it.
One could object, as I do, that no
analogy from mechanics can do
complete justice to the phenomenon of human life or mere life
(i.e., not qualified as human) for
that matter, since it cannot sufficiently take into account the
specific note of all living phenomena, their organicity. In this
line, one could reasonably argue
for immediate hominization by
noting that a living human individual, on account of his organicity, is a con tin u u m, i.e., a
continuous whole whose stages
cannot be radically separated and
juxtaposed. Thus, an embryo is
not merely an embryo, or a fetus
nothing more than a fetus. In reality, an embryo or a fetus is
what he is to persist to be and become.
On the other hand, one could
argue, as in fact Fr. Donceel does,
that the Cartesian view, on the
contrary, more readily corroborates the theory of immediate
hominization and not delayed
hominization. The case for this
position is as follows : in Cartesian
dualism, the human soul may be
considered the efficient cause of
the human body. Accordingly, the
February, 1976

human soul as a separate, spiritual thinking substance is capable
of inhabiting, as it were, an unorganized body (the extended
substance of the zygote), and,
then, proceed to develop this pot ential human body into an actual
human body in much the same
way as a sculptor molds clay into
a statue. Clearly, the immediate
hominization of the zygote is entirely plausible in this understanding of the relation of the
human soul to the human body.
But, Fr. Donceel rightly counters this position by disclaiming
the validity of the analogy that
the soul is the "sculptor" of the
body. In effect, it equates human
beings with mere artifacts. Fr.
Donceel instead upholds Thomistic hylomorphism and its teaching that the human soul is the
formal cause or substantial form
of the human body. In this system of thought, form (a structure
or intelligible unity having no
power as such) and matter are
essentially correlative notions.
The form, consequently, can
emerge and exist only in matter
sufficiently developed and disposed for it.22 In other words, the
soul as a formal cause does not
form or produce the body, but
rather is the first act of this organized body. Applied to man,
this means that the human soul
can exist only in a highly developed body (i.e., one with a brain).
The zygote and the embryo,
therefore, cannot be animated by
a human soul as their substantial
form, since no highly organized
body is yet present. At most, they
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are animated by plant and sensitive souls later transformed into
a human soul.
To clarify this complex, metaphysical thought, Fr. Donceel
makes use of several analogies. 23
In Cartesianism, the soul as efficient cause is related to a body
much like the sculptor is to a
statue or an architect or a blueprint is to a finished building. Hylomorphism, however, in its conception of the soul as a formal
cause, relates the human soul
(whence humanity) to the body
in the same fashion as the shape
of a statue is related to the statue
itself or the shape of a building
(its "building-ness") to a completed building. In other words,
just as the essences, "statue-ness"
and "building-ness" are not realities apart from existing statues
and buildings, so also "humanness" or humanity is present only
in sufficiently organized human
bodies.
Thus, the zygote or the embryo
with its virtual or potential human body possesses humanity
only potentially. It achieves true
humanity only after the development of an actual human body.
To elucidate this point, a deflated
baH analogy is developed by Fr.
Donceel. His argument may be
paraphrased as follows: just as a
deflated ball contains merely a
virtual sphericity, and acquires
actual sphericity only after having been inflated, in a like fashion, the zygote and the embryo
possesS' a virtual or potentia! humanity alone, and receive the sub-
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stantial form of man (i.e., actual
humanity) only upon the development of a highly organized
body.
An objection to Fr. Donceel's
thesis, however, must be raised at
this point. Does Fr. Donceel, in
fact, overcome the chief deficiency of the Cartesian-dualist
view, namely, that it overlooks
the organicity of man and mistakes him for a mere artifact?
Has he actually presented an adequate account of the nature of
man and the phenomenon of human life? I think not. The analogy
of the statue, building, and ball
are all borrowed from the inanimate world. Whatever may be the
correct metaphysical interpretation of their reality,24 it is an error to think an interpretation
which suffices to describe inanimate phenomena is, likewise, adequate for explaining the nature of
living phenomena. Life is a
unique, irreducible phenomenon ,
and organicity is an univocal notion. No analogy to objects or
realities in the realm of the nonliving, therefore, can place the reality of an organism into proper
relief. After all, the process of
" growth," which occurs when air
is pumped into a deflated ball to
make it an inflated one hardly
parallels the growth of a living
human organism from an embryo
into a fetus and a fetus into a
child. The former process is no
more than a mechanical procedure of an individual inflating a
ban with a pump! But the latter,
however, is an entirely immanent
Linacre Quarterly

process of growth of an actual
human organism developing all its
potentialities.
In the end, this approach for
upholding the delayed hominization of the conceptus seems to
hinge upon "appearances:" if the
fetus looks human, it is human :
otherwise, no. Moreover, how can
it resolve the differences of opinion concerning the biologically
edifying point mar kin g the
boundary between a potential and
an actual human being? Some
may say the traces of a rudimentary brain suffice for humanity. Others may argue for the
presence of a structurally complete brain. Still others may prefer that the spinal cord also be
present along with a complete
brain. But then, are we not in the
same dilemma that ineluctably
confronted the psycho logistic and
sociologistic approaches? Does
not any attempted solution necessarily entail begging the question?
No, the biologistic, psychologistic, and sociologistic conceptions of the nature of man are
artificial frameworks creating
many, insolvable pseudo-problems
regarding the line of demarcation
between actual and potential persons or between merely human
life and authentically personal
life. In reality, no such line exists.
To conclude briefly, it appears
necessary to reject the solutions
offered by the biologistic, psychologistic, and sociologistic attempts to explain the problematical nature of man , the person, and
human life along with the theory
0'£ delayed hominiza:tion. In> their
February, Un6

stead, I suggest that there is a
strong need for the development
of a personalist metaphysics,2·;
which would be more consonant
and faithful to the sublime, Biblical vision of man as created in the
image and likeness of God . Two
points 26 call for special develop"
ment, first, the Marcelian notions
of being and having, and secondly, the relation of potentiality to
actuality. In a personalist perspective, certain pivotal insights
are more readily grasped and capable of being deepened, as for
example, - the primacy of being
over having, the fact that a person
mayor may not have a personality, the truth that potentiality is
a kind of actuality, the fact that
the zygote has the being of the
brain which the fetus subsequen~
ly has, etc.
Simultaneously, one particular
moral attitude must become more
widespread and developed, namely, reverence.!' Reverence is the
response to the call of being itself, and only in a reverent attitude can one attain a true know!."
edge of being and grasp and appraise the values grounded in being. Reverence, moreover, is the.
most effective antidote to utili"
tarianism, since only in a reverent
attitude does one realize that the
value of being comes from God
and is subtracted from the ar~
bitrary, egoistic desires and utilitarian motivation of man.
In the abortion controversy,
reverence to life acquires speciaJ
import. No adequate assessment
of the value of each individual
human being is possible without
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reverence. When confronted with
the biologistic, psychologistic, and
sociologistic conceptions of man
with their dualistic separation of
human individuals into potential
and actual persons, one can not
help but suspect that, in the final
analysis, the really determining
factors for deciding whether a
particular individual merits humanity are more often than not
utilitarian considerations alone.
The only sure remedy to the abortion crisis is reverence.
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image of God ) directly refers to a bortion.
It is true that in a ve rse lik e Exodus
21:22 the unde rly ing vi ew seem s to be
that the fetus is not equa l in dignity to
a man, and, the refore, tha t an a bortion
should not exact the sam e pena it.y as
a homi cide. But, the re a re othe r scriptural t e xts in which a contrary current
is present. If one appeals to texts like
Psa lm 139 :13-15 or 2 M acca bees 7:2029, for exa mple, one could de fini tely
sus ta in tha t a fe tus, a t least impli citly.
is understood to be full y huma n a nd
a n image of God. In thi s line, th e com mandmen t aga inst murde r is directly
relevant.
No e xpli cit tea ching on a bortion a nd
condemna tion of it is found in e it he r
the Old or N e w T es ta m ents. Howeve r.
on e can find t he n ecessa ry founda tion s
sus ta ining t h e la te r Christian con demnation of a bortion in Sacred S c ripture. Analogously, though the re are
m a ny p assages throu ghout the Bible
e ither directly or indirectly re fe rring
to sla ve ry, n owhere is sla ve ry ex pli citly condemned . None theless, a ll th e essentia l underpinnings (e .g., all m en as
be ing created in the image of God , a ll
me n a s children of t he sam e Fathe r,
no essenti a l difference be tween s la ves
a nd free m en , etc.) of the la te r d enunciation of sla ve ry by the Church
a re present in the Bible.
9. Calla h a n , Danie l, A bortion: L aw.
Choice & Mo rality (N ew York : M acmillan Co., 1970) .
10. I bid. , pp. 497f.
1l. We ca n only say tha t th ere a re
"' more strictly" a nima l aspects of th e
huma n pe rson , because a ll a s pects of
the huma n pe rson a re fully person-a l
owing to the essen tia l uni ty of the huma n person. N othing in t he bodily dimension of the huma n pe rson is m e rely a nimal. This fa ct is the ve ry reason
[o r the ex is te n ce of the sepa ra te discipline , m edi cal e thi cs.
12. von Hilde bra nd , D ., Ethics, pp.
136f.
13. Ashley Montagu 's position has
bee n c riti c ized by seve ra l a u th o rs. C f. ,

February , 1976

fo r example , Ge rma in G . Grisez, A borlion: The My lhs, Ihe Realities, and
Ih e A rguments ( New York : Corpus
Books, 1970), pp. 277ff ; Dona ld D e M a rco, " The Philosophical Roots in
W este rn Culture for th e Pro-Abo rtion
Sta nd," Linacre Quart erly, vol. 41 , no.
2, p. 92 ; K. D. Whiteh ead, R espectable K illing: Th e New Abortion Im perative (N ew Roch elle , N .Y.: Ca tholi cs U nited for the F a ith, Inc., 1973),
p. 54. The subsequent quota tion can
be found in Montagu 's le tte r to th e
New York T im es, March 3, 1967. It
is quoted in its entirety by Gri sez a nd
in pa rt by D e M a rco a nd Whitehead .
14. It is ra the r significant that t hese
posit ions, which basically a re non m eta physical a pproach es to reali ty ,
tacitly presuppose a dua li st metaphysics of m a n . Christi a n philosophy,
on the contra ry, tra ditiona lly supports
a uni ta ry vi s ion of m a n.
15. The exac t te rminology u sed in
a given insta n ce depends on the author
in question. Certa in a uthors u se the
te rms "huma n" a nd "pe rsonal" inte rch a n geably. Othe r authors, howeve r ,
do not consider them to be synonyms.
The re fore , in some writings, the term,
" huma n " re fe rs to a " pe rson, " while
in others, it must be unde rs tood to
mean "pre-pe rsonal."
16. After eight weeks, the embryo,
n ow called the fetus, possesses a bra in ,
bu t one not yet fully developed. The
fe tus' brain structure is comple ted a fte r t welve wee ks. Some a uthors, the re fore, may choose to argu e for the hum a nity of the fe tus at the eighth week,
but others may p refer to place it at the
tweUth week. D eciding which is the
rea lly correct position is not relevent
to us as our c ritique will a ttack this
whole way of reasonin g a bou t h u m a n
life.
17. As quo ted in K. D . Whiteh ead ,
op . cit., p. 58.
18. From another persp ective, howeve r, a certa in a nalogy m ay be obse rved between a blueprint a nd DNA.
The genetic code, which is conta ined
in DNA , is the ba sic de te rminin g factor of a person 's phys ical fea tures, a nd

47

also appea rs to influen ce certain psychological aspects of the person. N evertheless, the differe nces between the
two are greater than the ir similarities.
A bluep rint never becom es a physical
feature of a n edifice, while DNA is a
basic biological constituent of a huma n
individual.
19. Cf., for example, Germain G .
Grisez, op. cit., pp. 275f, 283; Robert
E. Joyce & Mary Rosera Joyce, Let
Us Be Born (Chicago: Franciscan
H e rald Press, 1970), pp. 29ff.
20. Donceel, J ., S.J., " Abortion : Media t e v. Immedia te Animation," Continuum, vol. 5 (1967), pp. 167-71;
Idem , "Immediate Animation and D el aye d Hominization," Theological
Studies, XXXI (1970) , pp. 76-105;
Patrick J . O' Mahony & Malcom Potts,
" Abortion a nd the Soul," The Month,
224 (1967) , pp. 45-50.
21. Cf. Donceel's Theological Studies
a rticle, p. 76.
22. O' M a hony & Potts, op. cit., p.
47.
23. Cf. Donceel's Continuum a rticle,
p . 169 a nd his Theological Studies article, pp. 83, 94.
24. The Thomistic-h ylomorphist
metaphysics as presented by Fr. Donceel does give a suffi cient account of
ina nimate reality , but it does not seem,
in my opinion, to provide a convincing
e xpla n ation of organic phenomena. A
refined hylomorphism taking into account organicity may accomplish this
task.
Anothe r point is worthy of note. Fr.
Donceel a lso m a kes u se of a strictly
theological argument from a uthority
to help support his philosophical thes is
(Cf. his Theological Studies a rticle, p .
86). He draws our attention to the
definition of the substa ntial unity of
man by the Council of Vienne (Denzinger-Schonmetzer 902). This Council at once endorses the hylomorphic
conception of m a n , a nd condemns all
forms of Pla tonic or Cartesian dua lism. Its primary purpose was to protect the reality of the huma n nature
of Christ (DS 900) against the errors
of Peter John Olieu, who a dmitted the

48

unity of the huma n person, but not the
unity of the huma n n ature. The a rgument is, however, of relative va lidity,
as Fr. Donceel himself stresses, for the
intent of the Cou ncil was not to de fine
h ylomorphi sm as s uch, but to de fin e
the essentia l unity of man by making
u se of the theory of hylomorphism .
25. Cf. Joyce & Joyce, op. ci t., pp.
21-24, 37f, 90ff for helpful indications.
26. Such a m et a physics would also
have to be cap a ble of responding to
the objections from biology to the
th eo ry of immediate homini zation ,
e.g., the problem of twinning or the
formation of identi cal twins and · th e
fact that a con s iderable percentage of
fe cunda ted ova never, i t seems, become im planted in the u terus. It is
beyond the limits of this bri ef study
to treat these objections in detail. It
su ffices to n ote that reasonable a nswers to them h ave been suggested indicating that the difficulties posed by
them a re not insurmountable. Cf., e.g.,
Grisez, op . cit. , pp. 23-32, 274 a nd
Joyce & Joyce, pp. 31-35. The d evelopme nt of ide n t ical twins seem s to be
a case of asexual reproduction , a pos ··
s ible example of parthenogenesis. It
h as thus been suggested that ide nti cal
twins a re, in reality , the grandchildren
of their putative pa re nts. Grisez refers
to Luigi Gedda, Twins in History and
Science (Springfield, Ill.: Cha rles C .
Thomas, 1961), p. 125 on this po in t.
The argument accrues added respectability with the imminent possibility
of cloning human individuals.
Confronted with the fact of the la rge
percentage loss of fecundated ova, on'3
could point to God 's inscrutable will.
True, it would m ean that m any persons never a re destined to achieve an
a dult existence. But, then, it would
also a ppear to be a fact that a m a jority of me n never become perfect
similitudes of God, the very reason
for their exist en ce.
27. For a con cise trea tment of reverence, cf. Dietrich and Alice von
Hildebrand, The Art of Living (Chicago : Franciscan Hera ld Press, 1965),
pp. 1-9.

Linacre Quarterly

